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Abstract
How does the presence of multilateral institutions affect the sustainability of trade-policy
cooperation? Do free-trade agreements make multilateral cooperation less sustainable? Will
countries be more likely to deviate from negotiated tariffs when more trade liberalization re-
alizes in the future? These questions have been studied in theory literature using models that
feature repeated games, but have yet to be quantitatively analyzed. In this paper, I propose a
methodology to quantitatively characterize the equilibrium strategies on tariffs of various na-
tions in a widely used repeated-game framework. I then apply this methodology to address
these questions from a quantitative perspective. The numerical results computed from a rea-
sonably comprehensive general equilibrium trade model corroborate previous analysis derived
theoretically from simpler trade models. However, only free-trade agreements appear to influ-
ence the sustainability of trade-policy cooperation with quantitative significance.
JEL Classification: C7, F1, F4
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I Introduction
The global trading system is one of the most prominent examples of successful international
policy cooperation, as countries maintain liberalized trade despite the opportunity each has to
gain by raising their import tariffs. To explain why low tariffs can be sustained, interactions in
international trade policy are typically modeled as a repeated game. Because a country can improve
welfare by imposing tariffs that are higher than negotiated levels, deviation can only be deterred
when future loss as a result of deviation is larger than the gain. This framework has also been
used to study how the existence of multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO), preferential trade agreements, or changes in trade volume can affect the sustainability of
low tariffs.
Although existing theoretical analysis on trade policy has widely used repeated-game models,
related quantitative works using the same framework is rare. If the observed low tariffs are consid-
ered an equilibrium outcome of the repeated game, each country’s optimized gain from imposing
higher tariffs is outweighed by subsequent welfare loss due to other countries’ retaliation in the
future. Without characterizing the equilibrium quantitatively, however, determining whether such
low tariffs can still be sustained under external changes can be difficult. For example, when two
countries sign a free-trade agreement (FTA), gains and future loss as a result of deviation will
be different not only for the participating countries but for other countries as well. To investi-
gate whether trade-policy cooperation is still sustainable requires quantifying how these welfare
consequences change in the new equilibrium of the repeated game.
In this paper, I propose a methodology to quantitatively characterize countries’ equilibrium
strategies on tariffs. This methodology is compatible with numerous theoretical works that rely on
repeated games to explain observed low tariffs, and can be used to study how changes in the world
trading system can influence trade-policy cooperation. I first introduce the features these repeated-
game models share. In particular, by describing each stage game with a static trade model, I
can compute each country’s one-period gain from deviation and the future loss as a result of the
deviation. Given these computed welfare changes, I can then compute the minimum patience (i.e.,
discount factor) needed such that an infinite reversion to the punishment phase can sustain the
cooperative tariffs. When the deviating country does not incur any loss in punishment phase (the
case of winning a trade war first discussed in Johnson (1954), for example), this number will be
larger than one, implying that low tariffs are not sustainable. When the minimum patience is less
than one, we can still infer which country is more likely to deviate by comparing this measure
across countries. For this reason, throughout the paper I will refer to this computed minimum
discount factor as a measure of the propensity to deviate.
I then use a multi-country, multi-industry quantitative trade model to illustrate how this method-
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ology can be applied. In this reasonably comprehensive general equilibrium model, governments
can use tariffs to improve welfare, measured by either real expenditure or sectoral profits weighted
by political incentives as in Grossman and Helpman (1994). Focusing on the major players in inter-
national trade policy negotiation, I first numerically compute each country’s static welfare change
in the deviation phase: each country imposes tariffs that maximize its objective function given
other countries’ tariffs remaining unchanged. Not surprisingly, all countries can improve their own
welfare at the expense of other countries when deviating from low tariffs. In the benchmark case
where welfare is measured by real expenditure, the potential one-period welfare gain ranges from
1.1% (Mercosur) to 4.5% (Canada).
I then compute static welfare changes in four counterfactual scenarios relevant to the equilib-
rium strategies in the punishment phase. Among them, the case of imposing Nash tariffs has been
most commonly used in the theoretical analysis of trade policy cooperation, although the case of
autarky has also been considered.1 I find that when these two forms of punishments are used, the
future loss of any deviating country outweighs the gain from deviation and the calculated mini-
mum discount factor to sustain cooperative tariffs is very small. In other words, the negotiated low
tariffs are sustainable when reverting to trade war or autarky infinitely are used to deter deviation.
In addition, I also consider two other forms of punishment that are less stringent. In the case of
the weakest punishment in which other countries impose WTO-bound tariffs against the deviating
country, the stage equilibrium with low tariffs is not sustainable: the calculated minimum discount
factor is greater than one for all countries.
Next, I present how this methodology can be applied to study theoretical findings in trade-
policy literature that have yet to be quantitatively analyzed. I first examine whether multilateral in-
stitutions such as the WTO reduce the incentives of countries to deviate. Here I focus on the WTO’s
role of verifying deviation and facilitating multilateral enforcement efforts.2 In other words, in a
world without multilateral institutions, countries can impose deviating tariffs against one other and
only be punished by the victim. Maggi (1999) uses a repeated-game framework that incorporates
a three-country, partial-equilibrium trade model to show countries can, in theory, sustain a higher
equilibrium payoff with multilateral enforcement than with bilateral enforcement. This is mostly
because the WTO can introduce punitive tariffs from third parties, which increases potential loss
from deviation. I compare the impact of the two enforcement mechanisms on the sustainability
of tariffs using the more comprehensive general equilibrium trade model, but still under the same
repeated-game framework. The quantitative results support Maggi’s claim qualitatively: contrary
to the case under the multilateral enforcement mechanism, the factual tariffs become unsustainable
1Examples of theoretical works involving infinite Nash reversion include Bagwell and Staiger (1990), Bagwell
and Staiger (1999a), and Limao and Saggi (2008). Discussions about using autarky to deter deviations can be found
in Dixit (1987), Bagwell and Staiger (1990) and Park (2000).
2 Bagwell, Bown and Staiger (2016) offers a comprehensive literature review of the role of GATT/WTO.
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under the bilateral enforcement mechanism as countries now gain by imposing deviating tariffs
against their weakest trading partners. However, the welfare consequences of removing the WTO
is in general not quantitatively significant.
I then turn to analyze whether preferential trade agreements promote or jeopardize the sus-
tainability of multilateral trade cooperation. This question has attracted greater attention since the
famous “building block” versus “stumbling block” argument raised by Bhagwati (1991). Although
related theoretical research has been fruitful, quantitative work is rare and mostly focuses on how
reductions in external most-favored-nation tariffs vary with exposure to preferential trade arrange-
ments.3 I first quantitatively identify the tariff complementarity effect and the punishment effect
of enforceable bilateral FTAs. The tariff complementarity effect describes the situation in which
an FTA will cause its member countries to impose lower external tariffs in the case of deviation.
The punishment effect, on the other hand, is like the mirror image of the tariff complementarity
effect: the FTA member countries will impose lower punitive tariffs against deviating non-member
countries. According to Bagwell and Staiger (1999b), these two effects are the main channels
through which FTAs can affect the sustainability of multilateral trade cooperation in the standard
repeated game framework. The numerical results show these two effects on average reduce median
optimal tariffs in the deviation phase and punishment phase by 12.7% and 11.6%, respectively. I
then compare how the propensity of countries to deviate changes when FTAs are negotiated. I find
that a new FTA always makes non-member countries more likely to deviate from negotiated tariffs,
whereas the propensity to deviate could either increase or decrease for member countries.
Finally, I analyze the impact of global trade liberalization on sustainability of trade-policy
negotiation. I model trade liberalization as an exogenous, symmetric reduction in tariffs for all 10
countries included to study how the propensity of countries to deviate varies along this process.
Treating the reduced tariffs as negotiated tariffs to which countries agree to adhere, I can then
apply the methodology developed previously to trace how countries’ propensity to deviate varies
along with worldwide trade liberalization. My results indicate that, with the exception of Japan,
the propensities to deviate for all other countries are relatively stable.
Previous quantitative analysis of trade-policy negotiation that incorporates repeated games is
rare, despite the framework’s popularity in theoretical studies. My work is closely related to Ossa
(2014), which provides a first numerical analysis of non-cooperative and cooperative trade policy.
Relying on the same procedure to compute welfare changes in the deviation phase and punishment
phase, I extend his work by adding inter-temporal interactions into the static trade model. Incor-
porating the repeated-game framework allows me to quantitatively investigate various theoretical
findings from existing literature. For example, I believe this paper is the first attempt to quan-
tify the tariff complementarity effect and the punishment effect of FTAs discussed in Bagwell and
3see Estevadeordal, Freund and Ornelas (2008) and Limao (2006), for example.
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Staiger (1999b).4 Likewise, no precedent exists for quantitatively identifying the extent to which
multilateral institutions can improve the sustainability of trade negotiation as theorized in Maggi
(1999).
Whereas theory literature mostly considers Nash tariffs as punishment once deviation is ob-
served, I also consider autarky and two other means of punishment in the quantitative exercise.
The first scenario is sanction: countries in each period of the punishment phase impose optimal
tariffs against the deviating country while keeping cooperative tariffs among each other. In addi-
tion, I also consider the possibility that the punishment phase is still disciplined by WTO rules
and bound tariffs are imposed against the deviating country. This punishment strategy is much
weaker than the other three and all countries will choose to deviate from cooperative tariffs in the
benchmark case. In other words, when a country wants to abandon WTO rules and deviate from
low tariffs, punishments that are constrained by WTO are no longer effective deterrents. By in-
troducing two more plausible means of punishment, this paper also relates to existing research on
deterrents to deviating from cooperative tariffs and the role of WTO’s dispute settlement.5
Although the static trade model I use in this paper builds on the one first discussed in Krugman
(1980), the methodology introduced is flexible enough to incorporate alternative trade models. For
example, I do not foresee any obstacle using other quantitative trade models such as those in Eaton
and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003) to quantify equilibrium strategies. Ossa (2015) shows that
gains from trade among these gravity models will differ once the industry dimension of trade flows
is taken into account. Hence, choosing other static models that feature multiple sectors will lead to
different characterizations. In addition, the procedure discussed in this paper should not have any
problem incorporating other plausible means of punishment.
The data used in this paper build upon those analyzed in Ossa (2016). Throughout this paper,
I focus on the world’s nine largest economies6 and a residual Rest of the World. Each economy
is further disaggregated into 33 industries. Trade, production, and applied tariff data come from
the Global Trade Analysis Project database (GTAP 8) for the year 2007. Following the “exact
hat algebra” popularized by Dekle, Eaton and Kortum (2007), I express equilibrium conditions in
changes to reduce the number of parameters that need to be calibrated. In addition, calculating
tariffs imposed by welfare-maximizing governments in various counterfactual scenarios involves
high dimensional numerical optimization. Hence, to improve efficiency, I use the method of math-
ematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), which is first introduced by Su and
Judd (2012).
4Saggi, Stoyanov and Yildiz (2018) empirically confirms the existence of the complementarity effect. Their focus,
however, is on MFN tariffs instead of the sustainability of trade policy cooperation.
5See Beshkar (2010) and Bown (2004), for example.
6These countries are Canada, China, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the United States, the EU-25 countries,
and the Mercosur countries.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a methodology
to quantitatively characterize countries’ equilibrium strategies in a repeated-game framework, and
provides some intuitions on why the minimum patience needed to sustain cooperative tariffs can
be considered a measure of the incentive to deviate. Section III applies the methodology with a
standard multi-sector trade model and presents some numerical results. In the subsequent three
sections, I then study some theoretical findings in the existing literature from a quantitative per-
spective. Specifically, Section IV is devoted to analyzing the impact of multilateral institutions
on the sustainability of trade-policy cooperation. Section V focuses on the impact of FTAs, and
Section VI discusses how countries’ propensity to deviate varies with exogenous worldwide trade
liberalization. The last section offers some conclusions.
II Methodology
In this section, I develop a methodology to quantify equilibrium strategies of trade policy in
a repeated-game framework. Subsection II.1 discusses the setup of the repeated game and static
welfare changes that can be computed from quantitative trade models. In Subsection II.2, I char-
acterize the equilibrium strategy that will be used to quantify the sustainability of trade-policy
cooperation in following sections.
II.1 Repeated Game
Consider any static trade model in which the government’s only control is tariffs. Hence, the
only parameters that are allowed to change exogenously in the trade model are tariffs. We can let
W j(t j, t− j) denote the one-period welfare of the government in country j, which is determined by
its own tariffs and all other countries’ tariffs. Note W j(t j, t− j) can either be the real expenditure that
represents the households’ welfare in country j, or some measures that capture political interests
as in Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Ossa (2014). In each period, every country with discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1) sets its own tariffs, and current-period welfare is determined. In the next period,
all past choices are observed and new tariffs are set. The stage game is repeated infinitely. This
repeated game is stationary in the sense that none of the parameters change over time.
I assume the repeated game starts with negotiated tariffs all countries have agreed to follow.
Although they resemble the notion of cooperative tariffs in trade-policy literature, negotiated tar-
iffs do not take any stand on whether they are on the efficient frontier. In fact, I focus only on
the sustainability of some given set of tariffs throughout this paper. Whether the negotiated tariffs
maximize the joint welfare of all countries is beyond the scope of this paper. I follow the termi-
nology used in game theory literature and define the equilibrium in the stage game in which no
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country deviates from the negotiated tariffs as the static cooperative equilibrium.
This repeated game has multiple equilibria. I will focus on those equilibria that are relevant to
trade-policy negotiation. When a country chooses to deviate from negotiated tariffs, it will impose
tariffs that maximize its static welfare, given that other countries’ tariffs do not change. I define
the deviation phase of this repeated game as the period in which one country deviates but the static
cooperative equilibrium has been kept in all previous periods. Let superscript D and C denote
optimal deviating tariffs in the deviation phase and negotiated tariffs in the cooperative equilibrium
respectively. I can then define country j’s (one-period) percentage welfare gain from deviation:
Ω j(tDj ) ≡
W j(tDj , t
C
− j)
W j(tCj , t
C
− j)
− 1. (1)
Throughout this paper, I will focus only on cases in which Ω j is positive. In other words, I
assume every country can improve its welfare by deviating from negotiated tariffs. To sustain the
static cooperative equilibrium, equilibrium strategies need to include a punishment phase to deter
deviation from negotiated tariffs. The punishment phase is defined as the periods following the
deviation phase in which other countries impose tariffs in such a way that the deviating country is
expected to experience a welfare loss. The deviating country will still impose tariffs to maximize
its own welfare given other countries’ tariffs in the punishment phase, but such welfare-maximizing
tariffs will be different from those in the deviation phase. On the other hand, other countries do
not necessarily maximize their welfare in the punishment phase. Let superscript P denote tariffs in
the punishment phase. I can also define country j’s static one-period percentage welfare loss from
deviation in the punishment phase:
Φ j(tPj , t
P
− j) ≡
W j(tPj , t
P
− j)
W j(tCj , t
C
− j)
− 1. (2)
Throughout this paper, I assume that Ω j(tDj ) > Φ j(t
P
j , t
P
− j). In other words, it is impossible for the
deviating country’s welfare to improve more in the punishment phase than in the deviation phase.
When other countries are able to punish the deviating country at least to some extent, we should
expect Φ j to be negative.
A country’s choice on tariffs in the deviation phase does not involve much ambiguity, because
the deviating country will always choose tariffs that maximize static welfare. On the other hand,
what tariffs should be imposed in the punishment phase to deter deviation is not as obvious. Ex-
isting theoretical research mostly considers two types of punishment tariffs. The more popular
punishment involves a Nash equilibrium in which players simultaneously maximize their own
welfare given others’ tariffs. Moreover, as Dixit (1987) has pointed out, autarky is also a possible
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equilibrium in the stage game. Even though countries’ intuitive understanding will serve to avoid
autarky in the static game, threatening to revert to autarky can more effectively deter cheating.7
Whereas Nash tariffs and autarky are commonly used in the theoretical analysis of trade ne-
gotiations, they are generally considered extremely harsh punishments in reality. For example,
imposing Nash tariffs in the punishment phase would lead to a “global trade war” scenario in trade
models with more than two countries and would imply deviations from negotiated tariffs even
among the non-deviating countries. In the numerical analysis of this paper, I introduce two more
types of punishment that are less harsh than Nash tariffs and autarky. The first one is a bound tariff:
the maximum rate of tariff allowed by the WTO to be imposed among WTO member countries.
I also consider the possibility that when one country deviates from the cooperative equilibrium in
the previous period in a repeated game, all other countries impose Nash tariffs to the deviating
country only, but sustain negotiated tariffs between each other. Although these four scenarios in
the punishment phase all act as deterrents against deviation from negotiated tariffs, they do lead to
different quantitative results when the sustainability of the cooperative equilibrium is analyzed in
later sections.
II.2 Equilibrium Strategy
Note that future welfare loss as a result of deviation depends not only on means of punishment
(and hence static welfare loss), but also on equilibrium strategies of the repeated game. The one
equilibrium strategy the trade-policy literature has studied intensively is that of keeping the co-
operative stage equilibrium when no country deviates, and having a punishment phase of infinite
periods if any deviation is observed. This strategy is formally defined as follows:
1. Each country imposes cooperative tariffs tC in every stage game unless some country devi-
ated from cooperation in the past.
2. If one country has not played tC in the past and some other countries incur a welfare loss in
the deviation phase, every country will enter a permanent punishment phase and impose tP
for all future periods.
To analyze the sustainability of the cooperative stage equilibrium, define β j as the minimum pa-
tience (discount factor) needed to satisfy the self-enforcing constraint of country j:
Ω j(tDj ) +
∞∑
n=1
β j
nΦ j(tPj , t
P
− j) = 0.
7This argument is also raised in Park (2000) which shows that the autarky punishment instead of the interior Nash
punishment may provide the small country with greater bargaining power.
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We can then express β j in terms of welfare changes in the deviation and punishment phase:
β j =
Ω j(tDj )
Ω j(tDj ) − Φ j(tPj , tP− j)
(3)
The above strategy constitutes a Nash equilibrium in which no country will deviate if β >
β j,∀ j. Therefore, a lower β j implies that country j is less likely to deviate from the cooperative
stage equilibrium.8 Note that when Φ j is positive, the resulting β j will be larger than one. Since
β ∈ (0, 1), the cooperative stage equilibrium will be unsustainable. One possible explanation of the
positive Φ j is the situation described in Johnson (1954), in which a large country can actually win
a bilateral trade war. In this case, because the deviating country does not incur a welfare loss in the
punishment phase, the cooperative stage equilibrium cannot be sustained.
Using β j to measure the sustainability of cooperative tariffs exploits one distinctive feature
of the repeated game framework: the deviating country will face other countries’ retaliation one
period after the deviation. Whereas this framework is mostly commonly used in the theoretical
analysis of trade policy cooperation, this feature of lagged punishment is actually supported by
empirical evidence. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO only allows retaliatory
responses to start after the DSB has concluded the panel process and granted authorization. Horn,
Johannesson and Mavroidis (2011) studies the 426 WTO disputes from 1995 to 2010. They find
that the average panel process of the disputes is 445 days, even though the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) of the WTO suggests that the completion of the panel process should not
be more than nine months. Among all the disputes studied, the panel process had been completed
within the statutory limits in only ten instances.
In Section B of the Appendix, I also discuss an alternative strategy that involves finite peri-
ods of punishment. If finite periods of punishment is considered, then the minimum length of
the punishment phase needed to deter a country from deviating can also be used to measure the
sustainability of the cooperative stage equilibrium. In the quantitative analysis in the following
sections of this paper, I consider the equilibrium involving infinite punishment as the equilibrium
strategy and use β to measure the sustainability of trade policy cooperation. This is mainly because
infinite punishment is the most commonly used equilibrium strategy in existing theoretical analy-
sis of trade policy cooperation.9 In addition, computing β is straightforward and does not involve
8If country j experiences a temporary preference shock that reduces its discout factor to a value less than β j,
sustaining cooperation in this case would entail higher tariffs as argued in Bagwell and Staiger (1990). However,
computing cooperative tariffs requires assumptions about the bargaining procedure and is extremely computationally
demanding, and hence will not be the focus of this paper.
9Existing works using temporary punishment usually emphasizes the role of renegotiation, which is not the focus
of this paper. One example is Limao and Saggi (2008) which allows both the conventional infinite Nash reversion
and a finite punishment phase in the repeated game. Quantifying renegotiation strategies usually involves additional
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additional assumptions. Computing the minimum length of the punishment phase in the case of
finite punishment, on the other hand, requires an estimate of the discount factor β as shown in the
Appendix.
III Numerical Analysis
In this section, I first present a multi-country, multi-sector quantitative trade model. In this
static model, governments can manipulate tariffs to improve welfare measured by either real ex-
penditure or sectoral profits weighted by political incentives. I then use this model to quantify each
country’s static welfare gain when deviating from negotiated tariffs as well as subsequent welfare
loss given means of punishment. The welfare changes in the punishment phase presented in Sub-
section III.2 include not only Nash tariffs and autarky but also two alternative scenarios that are
less harsh. Lastly, I also compute each country’s minimum patience and compares their propensity
to deviate using the methodology developed in Section II.
III.1 A Static Trade Model
The economy consists of N countries and S industries. I use subscript i or j to index countries
and s to index sectors. Each industry features monopolistic competition with constant elasticity
of substitution. Homogeneous consumers have access to a continuum of differentiated varieties.
The preference of a representative consumer in country j can be described by the following utility
function:
U j =
∏
s
[∑
i
∫ Mis
0
xi js(νis)
σs−1
σs dνis
] σs
σs−1µ js
, (4)
where xi js is the quantity of an industry s product manufactured in country i consumed in country j,
Mis is the mass of sector s varieties produced in country i, µ js is the Cobb-Douglas share of country
j’s expenditure spent on sector s varieties, and σs > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across sector
s varieties.
On the supply side, each variety is produced by exactly one firm. Firms within any sector are
homogeneous and their technology is described by the following production function:∑
j
θi jsxi js = ζislis, (5)
where lis is the labor an industry s firm requires in country i, θi js represents iceberg trade barriers on
arbitrary assumptions and are much more computationally demanding.
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sector s varieties from country i to country j, and ζis is the sectoral specific technology parameter.
Note that Mis in (4) is exogenously determined. Hence, this model does not feature free entry, and
firms are allowed to have positive profits10. In other words, we have piis ≡ Mis ∑ j(pisθi jsxi js−wilis),
where piis represents the sectoral profit for industry s in country i, pis is the ex-factory price of
sector s variety produced in country i, and wi is the wage rate in country i.
Define Y j as the country’s nominal income and P j as the aggregate ideal price index. Similarly,
let Y js be the nominal income of sector s in country j. Components of sectoral income Y js is
described by
Y js = w jL js + pi js +
L js
L j
R j,
where L js is the employment of sector s in country j, L j is exogenously given total employment in
country j, and R j is the total tariff revenue in country j. By definition, Y j =
∑
s Y js.
Tariffs are the only policy instrument allowed in this model. Let ti js be the ad valorem tariff
country j imposes on country i’s variety in sector s. To simplify notations, also define τi js = 1+ ti js.
Government preferences are described by the following objective function:
W j ≡
∑
s
λ jsW js, (6)
where W js ≡ Y jsP j is the real income of industry s in country j and λ js > 0 is that industry’s political
weight. λ js is scaled so that 1S
∑
s λ js = 1. In other words, one dollar in industry s is equivalent to
λ js dollars from an industry with average political weight in the government’s objective function.
Therefore, in the benchmark case when the political weights are set equal to one, W j =
Y j
P j
and the
government is simply maximizing the country’s real income.
In equilibrium, households maximize their utilities subject to budget constraint given prices.
Solving for the households’ utility maximization gives the demand for varieties in sector s pro-
duced in country i:
xi js =
(pisθi jsτi js)−σs
P1−σsjs
µ jsY j, (7)
where P js is the ideal price index of sector s in country j defined by P js =
[∑
i Mis(pisθi jsτi js)1−σs
] 1
1−σs
.
Given (7), each firm from sector s in country i maximizes its profit by charging a constant markup
10The model can also be solved with free entry and fixed costs of production, as in Krugman (1980). I choose this
version mostly because it rules out corner solutions with zeros productions in some sectors, so that the model can be
solved numerically with a simpler algorithm.
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over marginal costs:
pis =
σs
σs − 1
wi
ζis
. (8)
The static equilibrium of this model can be characterized by the following system of equations:
piis =
1
σs
∑
j
Misτ
−σs
i js
(
σs
σs − 1
θi js
ζis
wi
P js
)1−σs
µ jsY j (9)
wiLi =
∑
s
piis(σs − 1) (10)
Y j = w jL j +
∑
i
∑
s
ti jsMisτ
−σs
i js
(
σs
σs − 1
θi js
ζis
wi
P js
)1−σs
µ jsY j +
∑
s
pi js (11)
P js =
[∑
i
Mis
(
σs
σs − 1
wiθi jsτi js
ζis
)1−σs] 11−σs
. (12)
The first two conditions are derived by substituting (5), (7), and (8) into the definition of sectoral
profits and the labor market clearing condition Li =
∑
s Mislis, respectively. (11) involves substi-
tuting demand for xi js and the firm’s optimal pricing into the budget constraint. The last condition
is obtained by simply replacing pis in the formula of the sectoral ideal price index by (8). The
problem of solving this system directly is that unknown parameters {Mis, θi js, ζis} are difficult to
estimate empirically.
To circumvent this problem, I adopt the method popularized by Dekle et al. (2007). In partic-
ular, define Γi js as the factual value of sector s trade flowing from country i to country j evaluated
at world prices:
Γi js ≡ Mis
(
σs
σs − 1
θi js
ζis
wi
P js
)1−σs
τ−σsi js µ jsY j.
Then the conditions described by (9)-(12) can be rewritten in changes:
pˆiis =
∑
j
αi js(τˆi js)−σs
( wˆi
Pˆ js
)1−σs
Yˆ j (13)
wˆi =
∑
s
δispˆiis (14)
Yˆ j =
w jL j
Y j
wˆ j +
∑
i
∑
s
ti jsΓi js
Y j
tˆi js(τˆi js)−σs
( wˆi
Pˆ js
)1−σs
Yˆ j +
∑
s
pi js
Y j
pˆi js (15)
Pˆ js =
[∑
i
γi js(wˆiτˆi js)1−σs
] 1
1−σs
, (16)
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where the “hat” variables denote the ratios between the counterfactual and factual values, αi js ≡
Γi js∑
n Γins
, γi js ≡ τi jsΓi js∑
s τm jsΓm js
, and δis ≡ (∑ j σs−1σs Γi js)/(∑t ∑n σt−1σt Γint).
Equations (13)-(16) represent a system of 2N(S + 1) equations with 2N(S + 1) unknowns
{wˆi, Yˆi, Pˆis, pˆiis}. Compared to the system represented by (9)-(12), this system has the following
advantages: first, the coefficients depend only on σs, λ js, and observables so that information on
{Mis, θi js, ζis} is no longer needed. In addition, all observables can be inferred directly from widely
available trade and tariff data because Y j =
∑
i
∑
s τi jsΓi js and w jL j = Y j − ∑i ∑s ti jsΓi js, where
piis =
1
σs
∑
j Γi js. Table 1 lists σs and averages of ti js and λ js for all 33 sectors. More discussions of
data and calibration can be found in Section A of the Appendix.
Given any counterfactual tariffs, we can solve equations (13)-(16) simultaneously and then
calculate welfare changes relative to the factual equilibrium by
Wˆ j =
∑
s λ jsY ′js
Pˆ j
∑
s λ jsY js
,
where Y ′js is the counter-factual income of sector s in country j. Note that the presence of aggregate
trade imbalances in the data is not coherent with this model. Hence, I follow the exercise in Dekle
et al. (2007) to construct a trade flow matrix without trade imbalance. All later calculations of
welfare changes given counterfactual tariffs will treat this purged trade flow data as the factual
equilibrium.
III.2 Welfare Changes in Stage Game
Table 2 presents each country’s welfare changes in the deviation phase. Entries under “Own”
are maximum one-period percentage gain in welfare when one country deviates but other countries
still impose tariffs in the static cooperative equilibrium, calculated following (1). Entries under
“Other,” on the other hand, are averages of other countries’ one-period welfare loss in the deviation
phase. Computing these welfare changes involves maximizing the government’s objective function
(6) subject to equilibrium conditions (13)-(16). The first two columns show welfare changes when
political weights are set to be one for all sectors in all countries. The last two columns take
political factors into consideration by including the calibrated political weight parameter λ js into
the government’s objective function.
From Table 2, we can see that all countries can gain at the expense of other countries in the de-
viation stage. Therefore, following the equilibrium strategy discussed in Section II, any country’s
deviation will trigger a punishment phase in the next period. Also note that incorporating political
weights into governments’ objective functions do not change the results substantially. Comparing
to the case without political weights, the maximum welfare gain in the deviation phase increases for
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four countries (South Korea, the United States, European Union, and Rest of World), but deceases
for the other six.
Table 3 and table 4 present one-period percentage welfare changes of the deviating country
in the punishment phase, both with and without political weights. Both tables consider four sce-
narios in the punishment phase. Among them, “Trade War” and “Autarky” are commonly used
as punishment in theoretical analysis that models trade policy cooperation as a repeated game. In
addition, I also consider two scenarios that involve less severe punishment and are hence more re-
alistic. “WTO Bound” refers to the static equilibrium in which victim countries impose the bound
rates (the maximum rates allowed by the WTO) against the deviating country, whereas the deviat-
ing country imposes optimal tariffs in response. On the other hand, “Sanction” refers to the static
equilibrium in which all other countries sanction the deviating country by imposing optimal tariffs
against the deviating country only, but sustain negotiated tariffs with each other.11 Note that for all
four scenarios in the punishment phase, retaliatory tariffs span all 33 agricultural and manufactur-
ing industries. This is actually consistent with the DSU rules articulated in WTO (1994): whereas
WTO only allows retaliatory tariffs to be imposed in the same sector as that in which the violation
was found (Article 22.3(a) of the DSU), it is also specified in Article 22.3(f) of the DSU that all
goods belong to the same sector. For example, when a country imposes high tariffs on automobiles,
other countries can counter with retaliatory tariffs on agricultural products.
Computing welfare changes under “WTO Bound” is done by first substituting WTO bound
rates as victim countries’ counter-factual tariffs, and then solving for the deviating country’s op-
timal tariffs given other countries’ punishment tariffs. Computing entries under “Sanction” and
“Trade War” both involve iterating the algorithm used to calculate optimal tariffs and re-optimizing
until the best-response equilibrium is found. The difference is that in the sanction case, each coun-
try can only optimize over tariffs against the deviating country, whereas in the trade-war case,
tariffs against all other countries are allowed to change. Similar to “WTO Bound”, the deviating
country imposes optimal tariffs given other countries’ punishment tariffs in these two scenarios.
Lastly, welfare changes in the case of autarky can be obtained by solving (13)-(16) numerically
with very high counterfactual tariffs.12
From Table 3 we can see that imposing WTO-bound tariffs is the weakest form of punish-
ment compared to the other three scenarios: no deviating country experiences a welfare loss in
the punishment phase in the case without political weights. In other words, if other countries re-
act to a deviation by imposing WTO bound rates in the punishment phase, the cooperative static
11Among the four scenarios in the punishment phase, Trade War and Autarky are Nash equilibrium in the stage
game but the other two are not.
12Computations that involve optimization are repeated multiple times with different initial values. Sometimes the
resulting tariffs are different, but welfare changes are stable because welfare is very flat in tariffs in the neighborhood
of its maximum.
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equilibrium is not sustainable. One interpretation of this result is that when one country abandons
the WTO rules and impose high tariffs, punishments that still follow WTO rules are no longer
considered effective deterrents.
All other three scenarios presented in Table 3 are harsher punishments than imposing bound
rates as shown in the average welfare loss. In these three punishment-phase scenarios, the only case
in which the static cooperative equilibrium is unsustainable is Japan under sanction. The positive
welfare change under sanction is mainly due to Japan’s extreme factual trade policy in agricultural
industries.13 Under sanction, although other countries impose punitive tariffs against Japan, our
definition of the scenario allows Japan to optimize over its tariffs. As a result, the country is able
to abolish the existing high factual tariffs, which actually leads to welfare improvement.
The last row of Table 3 shows the magnitude of the average welfare loss in trade war is larger
than that in sanction. This result is in line with the idea of the punishment effect discussed in
Bagwell and Staiger (1999b). In the punishment phase, imposing high tariffs against the deviating
country will increase trade volume among non-deviating countries. This trade diversion does not
generate much tariff revenue under sanction, because tariffs among non-deviating countries are
fixed at low levels. To the contrary, high tariffs among non-deviating countries under trade war
imply higher tariff revenue from trade diversion, creating additional incentives to impose higher
tariffs against the deviating country. Evidence that corroborates this explanation is presented in
Table 5, which lists the factual median tariffs and median tariffs in sanction and trade war with
no political weights. Under “Own” are median tariffs a country imposes against other countries,
whereas under “Other” are median tariffs imposed by other countries against that specific country.
We can see that, “Own” median tariffs for all countries do not differ significantly between sanction
and trade war, whereas “Other” tariffs are much lower in the sanction scenario.
Table 4 present one-period percentage welfare changes of the deviating country in the punish-
ment phase when political weights are incorporated. Overall, the patterns observed in the bench-
mark case presented in Table 3 still hold when political weights are taken into consideration. One
difference is that now India and Mercosur’s welfare change in the case of “WTO Bound” becomes
negative. This is because for these two countries, the sectors with high political weights also face
high bound tariffs. For example, both countries have highest political weight in the sector of wheat
(1.67 for India and 1.34 for Argentina). Meanwhile, the average bound tariff imposed on wheat is
also very high for these two countries (45.5% and 48.6%, respectively).
13As can be seen in Figure 1, the distribution of Japan’s tariff across sectors is very skewed. Japan’s factual tariff
on rice, wheat, and dairy are up to 513%, 73%, and 54%, respectively. On the other hand, its median tariff is only 1%.
15
III.3 Minimum Patience
Given Ω j and Φ j, I can then compute the minimum discount factor needed to sustain the static
cooperative equilibrium β j using (3). Table 6 presents the resulting β j in the benchmark case for
all scenarios in the punishment phase, whereas Table 7 presents the results when political weights
are incorporated. For all four scenarios, the average minimum patience is smaller when political
weights are included. However, the magnitude of difference is not very large and the patterns of
the two tables are very similar.
For both tables, the computed minimum patience needed to sustain the static cooperative equi-
librium exhibits a descending pattern from “WTO Bound” in the first column to “Autarky” in the
last. This pattern reflects the strength of the punishment strategies and hence the ability to deter de-
viation. Under “WTO Bound” which is the weakest means of punishment, all countries will deviate
from the static cooperative equilibrium in the benchmark case. In other words, when one country
has incentive to abandon the WTO rules and deviate from negotiated low tariffs, punishments that
are constrained by WTO are no longer effective deterrents. On the other hand, the computed β j is
much smaller than one for all countries under “Trade War” and “Autarky”. Consistent with most
existing theoretical findings using the repeated game framework, these two means of punishment
can effectively deter deviations from low cooperative tariffs.
The computed minimum patience β j in Table 6 and Table 7 can also be used to compare the
propensity to deviate across countries. For example, Japan is always among the most likely to
deviate for any given method of punishment. In fact, it is the only country that will deviate if
the punishment strategy involves infinite reversion to sanction. This is because Japan’s gain from
deviation is large whereas the loss in the punishment phase is mild relative to other countries.
On the other hand, Russia and Mercosur are in general less likely to deviate compared to other
countries.
To summarize, I first develop a static trade model in Subsection III.1, and then use it to quantita-
tively characterize countries’ equilibrium strategies in a repeated-game framework. The procedure
consists of two steps. First, I compute countries’ static welfare changes in the deviation phase and
the punishment phase. Next, I calculate the minimum patience (discount factor) needed to satisfy
the self-enforcing constraint of each country. I also use this measure to distinguish whether the
static cooperative equilibrium is sustainable under different scenarios of the punishment phase and
compare countries’ propensity to deviate from factual tariffs. From the results presented above, the
effect of incorporating the political weights into the analysis is limited. In the following sections, I
will use the procedure developed in this section to quantitatively analyze some theoretical findings
in the trade-policy literature.
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IV Trade Cooperation and Multilateral Institutions
This section is devoted to using the methodology discussed in Section II to analyze the role of
the multilateral enforcement mechanism in trade cooperation. In Maggi (1999), the multilateral
enforcement mechanism is defined as a punishment strategy whereby retaliative tariffs from all
countries follow any deviation. This contrasts to bilateral enforcement mechanism, in which only
the victim country retaliates. The author constructs a simple partial equilibrium trade model in a
repeated game, and demonstrates that “in the presence of bilateral imbalances of power, countries
can sustain a higher symmetric equilibrium payoff with multilateral enforcement than with bilateral
enforcement.” The rationale behind this result is straightforward: under the bilateral enforcement
mechanism, a country will impose high tariffs against its weakest trading partners, because the
strength of retaliation will be limited. On the other hand, under multilateral enforcement mech-
anism, punitive tariffs can also be imposed by third parties. This mechanism increases loss from
deviation and hence reduces maximum sustainable cooperative tariffs, which in turn result in higher
sustainable equilibrium payoffs.
In this section, I analyze the role of multilateral institutions quantitatively with a similar repeated-
game framework studied in Maggi (1999), but with the more comprehensive general equilibrium
trade model constructed in Section III. Welfare changes in the deviation and punishment phase
as well as the minimum patience the under the bilateral enforcement mechanism are computed
and compared with those under the multilateral enforcement mechanism. Such comparison allows
us to quantify the impact of multilateral institutions on countries’ equilibrium strategies and the
sustainability of trade-policy cooperation. The numerical results corroborate Maggi’s argument
qualitatively: factual tariffs will not be sustainable in a world without a multilateral enforcement
mechanism, and countries will impose deviating tariffs against its relatively weak trading partners.
However, in the new equilibrium with only a bilateral enforcement mechanism, the magnitude of
welfare changes is rather small.
Note that although not stated explicitly, the analysis presented in Section III actually relies on
the following two assumptions:
1. All other countries perfectly observe any country’s deviation from cooperative tariffs.
2. Once a deviation from negotiated tariffs is observed and some country experiences a welfare
loss, all other countries are obligated to participate in the punishment phase, regardless of
whether their welfare is compromised.
Given these assumptions, even if a country imposes optimal tariffs against only one country, all
other countries will retaliate. Hence, when any country deviates, it prefers to impose optimal tariffs
against all other countries. In a way, my analysis assumes the existence of some international
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organization such as the WTO to inform the trading community and execute punishment when
a deviation from negotiated tariffs occurs. These implicit assumptions resemble the idea of the
multilateral enforcement mechanism discussed in Maggi (1999).
To examine whether this mechanism improves the sustainability of trade cooperation, I apply
the same procedure developed in Section II, but drop the two assumptions stated above. In other
words, now no country observes the deviation or is allowed to retaliate, unless it is the victim
country in the deviation phase. As a result, not imposing optimal tariffs against all countries in
the deviation phase may be rational for the deviating country. For illustration purposes, I will
focus on sequential equilibria in which countries can impose optimal tariffs only to one other
country in the deviation phase, but the same analysis can be applied to the case of deviating against
multiple countries. Under bilateral enforcement, each country has nine potential targets, so we
need to analyze 90 possible deviations instead of just 10 under multilateral enforcement. For
each deviation, country j chooses tariffs only against country i to maximize its objective function
(6) subject to equilibrium constraints (13)-(16), while keeping its tariffs against other countries
unchanged at previously negotiated levels. All the quantitative results presented in this section are
computed by excluding the political weights in the government’s objective function.14
Table 8 summarizes welfare changes in the deviation phase. The first column lists the deviating
countries, and the entries under “Self,” “Target,” and “Others” are summary statistics of one-period
welfare changes of the deviating country, the victim country, and other countries, respectively.
Compared to the values in Table 2, we can see the magnitude of welfare changes under country-
specific deviation is smaller in general. This result is expected, because the deviating country
now can only manipulate tariffs against one other country. In addition, the results also indicate
considerable variation in gains from deviation. For example, Canada’s welfare gain can be as large
as 1.6% (targeting the United States) or as low as practically nothing (targeting Russia). Clearly,
such heterogeneity is related to the volume of factual trade between the deviating country and the
target country. Significant variation is also observed in the target country’s welfare loss. In general,
deviation from large economies (e.g., the United States and EU) can reduce the welfare of their
target countries to a greater extent. One surprising case is that when Korea imposes optimal tariffs
against India in the deviation phase, India’s welfare actually increases by 0.01%. This result is due
to the distorting factual tariffs imposed by Korea. For example, its tariff on the oil seed industry
imports from India is 612%, which is the largest factual tariff in our data set. But the calculated
optimal tariff on the oil seed industry when Korea deviates against India is 53%. The fact that the
calculated optimal tariffs in some industries are actually lower than factual tariffs leads to a slight
welfare improvement of the target country.
14As a robustness check, I also compute the corresponding welfare changes when the political weights are included.
The main arguments presented in this section still hold qualitatively.
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After calculating welfare gains in the deviation phase, the next step is to quantify corresponding
static welfare changes in the punishment phase. Following the analysis in Maggi (1999), I focus on
the scenario in which Nash tariffs are used in the punishment phase. Under bilateral enforcement,
the trade war equilibrium in the stage game refers to the case in which both the deviating country
and the target country impose Nash tariffs against each other while keeping tariffs against other
countries unchanged. To calculate such welfare changes in a bilateral trade war equilibrium, I
simply iterate the algorithm used to calculate results in Table 8 for the two involved countries and
re-optimize until a best-response equilibrium is found.
Figure 2 presents the static welfare changes of the trade war case. Because which country
deviates and hence the order of country pair does not matter in bilateral trade war, Figure 2 is set up
in such a way so that the country with greater welfare change is always in the x-axis. In the figure,
we observe three categories of welfare changes. The most abundant blue dots represent country
pairs with negative welfare changes for both countries. This is the case in the punishment phase
on which most studies in trade-negotiation literature focus. Any equilibrium represented by a blue
dot is sustainable (given that the discount factor is not too small), because the welfare loss in the
punishment phase will deter the potential deviating country. Also, the several green dots indicate
one country in the country pair has a positive welfare change. This is the scenario first described
in Johnson (1954), in which the bilateral trade war has a winner. If the winner happens to be the
deviating country, cooperation between these two countries is not sustainable. Lastly, the one dot
in red represents bilateral trade war between Korea and India, and the welfare change is positive
for both countries. As explained previously, the high distorting factual tariffs Korea imposes is
the reason for this abnormal result. Obviously, the negotiated tariffs between these two countries
are not sustainable under bilateral enforcement mechanism. Comparing Figure 2 and Table 2, we
can see the rationale presented in Maggi (1999) also works in the more comprehensive general
equilibrium model in this paper: factual tariffs can be sustained under multilateral enforcement but
not under bilateral enforcement when Nash tariffs are used as punitive tariffs in the punishment
phase.
Table 9 presents some country-pair specific features of the 11 cases in which the bilateral trade
war has a winner (excluding the Korea-India case). Two of the three features display different
patterns between the winners and the losers. The first one is average tariffs: winning countries on
average impose higher factual tariffs on imports from the losing countries. Japan and India impose
relatively high tariffs, and both countries are winners in three bilateral trade wars. In addition, the
winning countries on average also import more (as share of total imports) from the losing countries
than vice versa. On the other hand, the average export share does not appear different substantially
between the winning and losing countries.
The welfare consequences of removing the multilateral enforcement mechanism are summa-
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rized under “Welfare” in Table 10. Entries under “∆W” are the welfare changes in the new coun-
terfactual equilibrium. In this equilibrium, all 12 pair of countries with unsustainable factual tariffs
impose bilateral Nash tariffs against each other, but keep factual tariffs with other countries. The
following two columns are the number of cases in which a country will deviate and be deviated
against, respectively. For example, China will deviate against two other countries, be deviated
against by one other country, and its welfare change in the new equilibrium is 0.03%. In general,
welfare change is positively related to the number of pairs in which the country chooses to deviate,
and negatively related to the number of pairs in which the country is deviated against. Overall the
welfare changes are small, and some countries gain at the expense of others. Figure 2 to a large
extent preludes this result: the total number of red and green dots is significantly less that that of
blue dots. In addition, the welfare changes of red and green dots are mostly small. Therefore,
although the quantitative results presented in this section corroborate the mechanism described in
Maggi (1999), the magnitude of welfare consequences from removing multilateral institutions is
rather insignificant.
I also use (3) to calculate the minimum patience needed to sustain factual negotiated tariffs
(which will be denoted by β jBI) for the country pairs that are still sustainable under the bilateral
enforcement mechanism. Comparisons between β jBI and β jM, the minimum patience under the
multilateral enforcement mechanism, are presented under “Sustainability” in Table 10. We can see
that propensity to deviate only increases in less than half the remaining country pairs. For those
country pairs that remain sustainable under bilateral enforcement, removing multilateral institu-
tions does not appear to significantly reduce sustainability of trade cooperation.
Lastly, I explore the sustainability of the new equilibrium in which winners of the bilateral trade
war deviate under the bilateral enforcement mechanism. In particular, I assume that the deviating
countries and their corresponding victims countries impose bilateral Nash tariffs against each other
whereas other countries keep imposing cooperative tariffs. Treating this stage equilibrium in the
punishment phase as the new “cooperative” tariffs, I then compute the static welfare changes in the
second round of the punishment phase in which both the deviating country and the target country
impose Nash tariffs against each other. Comparing to the initial stage equilibrium with 11 country
pairs imposing Nash tariffs, now two more pairs will have a winner of the bilateral trade war and
the new “cooperative equilibrium” is still not sustainable under bilateral enforcement.
V Impact of Free Trade Agreements
In this section, I use the model developed in Section III to quantitatively analyze the impact
of FTAs on countries’ equilibrium strategies and hence sustainability of trade cooperation. I first
quantify the two major channels through which FTAs can affect trade-policy cooperation: the
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tariff complementarity effect and punishment effect. These two effects have been studied from
a theoretical perspective, but I am not aware of any existing research that tries to quantitatively
identify them. To preview the main results of this section, my analysis on bilateral FTAs shows
the tariff complementarity effect reduces average median tariffs in the deviation phase by 12.7%,
whereas the punishment effect in the trade war scenario reduces average median punitive tariffs in
the punishment phase by 11.6%. In addition, the average propensity to deviate for all 10 countries
increases if two other countries negotiate an FTA. However, for a member country, the post-FTA
propensity to deviate can either increase or decrease.
Whereas almost all existing studies on how FTAs influence trade-policy cooperation use a
repeated-game framework, I find the analysis in Bagwell and Staiger (1999b) particularly helpful
in understanding the quantitative results presented in this section. Assuming countries can deviate
from negotiated factual tariffs but not from any FTA, the authors construct an export-competing,
partial equilibrium model and discuss the possible effects of forming FTAs on sustaining trade
cooperation, two of which are relevant to this paper. The first effect is the tariff complementarity
effect: when two countries form an FTA, they have less incentive impose high external tariffs. In
other words, let tDFi j and t
D
i j denote country j’s optimal deviation tariffs against country i before and
after entering an FTA with some country other than i. Then the tariff complementarity effect is
equivalent to tDFi j < t
D
i j . The rationale behind this effect is as follows: raising tariffs against country
i will divert trade flows to other countries. Compared to the case without FTAs, zero tariffs between
country j and its FTA partner means less tariff revenue generated from diverted trade flows, which
leads to less incentive for country j to impose high tariffs against country i in the deviation phase.
In the framework presented in this paper, this effect implies Ω j(tDFi j ) < Ω j(t
D
i j). Therefore, via the
tariff complementarity effect, signing new FTAs will decrease member countries’ propensity to
deviate, thus enhancing the sustainability of trade cooperation.
The other effect discussed in Bagwell and Staiger (1999b) is the punishment effect, which can
be thought of as the flip side of the tariff complementarity effect in the punishment phase. This
effect can be illustrated by the following example: country i and country j have the opportunity
to enter a FTA, and country k is the external trading partner. When country k deviates, its welfare
loss in the punishment phase depends on punishment tariffs imposed by country i and country j.
If country i and country j negotiate a FTA, they have less incentive to impose high tariffs against
country k in the punishment phase, just like the tariff complementarity effect in the deviation phase.
Hence, the external country will face less future welfare loss after deviation. In this paper, the
punishment effect is equivalent to a smaller |Φk|. This effect should increase country k’s propensity
to deviate, which reduces sustainability of trade cooperation.
To examine whether these two effects exist in the more comprehensive general equilibrium
trade model in this paper, I first compute all 45 counterfactual equilibria in which two of the 10
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countries negotiate a FTA and impose zero tariffs on each other.15 Treating each counterfactual
equilibrium as the cooperative static equilibrium, I then calculate optimal tariffs and static welfare
changes (for all 10 countries, regardless of whether they are FTA members) in the deviation phase.
The trade-war scenario in punishment phase, because it is also the punishment strategy used in
Bagwell and Staiger (1999b). Lastly, following the assumption in Bagwell and Staiger (1999b),
deviation from the FTA is not allowed in either the deviation or the punishment phase.
Table 11 summarizes the main results related to the deviation phase. Entries under “FTA”
are average percentage welfare changes and average median optimal tariffs of each country in the
deviation phase when the country is also a FTA member in the counterfactual equilibrium (nine
equilibria are possible for each country). Entries under “non-FTA” are corresponding values if the
country is not in the FTA (36 equilibria in total for each country). I also list welfare changes and
median optimal tariffs calculated from factual data under “Factual” for comparison purpose. All
welfare changes are relative to the welfare levels in the actual equilibrium instead of counterfactual
FTA equilibrium. Compared to entries under “Factual” in Table 11, mean welfare changes and
mean median tariffs under “non-FTA” are almost identical. On the other hand, mean median tariffs
under “FTA” are lower than those under “Factual” for all 10 countries, indicating the presence of
the tariff complementarity effect. On average, median optimal tariffs of FTA member countries is
12.7% less than median optimal tariffs calculated from factual data. In addition, a country’s welfare
gain in the deviation phase after negotiating an FTA with another country on average decreases by
0.5%, or 20% of the welfare gain before entering the FTA. Note this significant shrink in welfare
gain results not only from the tariff complementarity effect, but also from the fact that now the
deviating country cannot impose optimal tariffs on its FTA partner.
Table 12 summarizes the main results under the trade war scenario in the punishment phase.
Note that whereas entries under “FTA” and “nonFTA” are averages of 9 and 36 equilibria re-
spectively, those entries under “Factual” are welfare changes and median tariffs of one trade war
equilibrium. We can see that all 10 countries’ welfare loss in the punishment phase is less than
that calculated with factual data, independent of whether the country is a FTA member. However,
explanations for such changes do depend on whether the country is a member. For the non-member
countries, the decrease in welfare loss in a trade war is due to the punishment effect as discussed
in Bagwell and Staiger (1999b): the average median tariffs imposed by FTA countries, displayed
under the fourth column in Table 12, are on average 11.6% less than those under “Factual.” This
effect is unnoticeable for FTA countries, because the average median tariffs from non-FTA coun-
tries are almost the same as those under “Factual.” Less welfare loss of the FTA member countries
is attributable to enforceable FTA contracts: their FTA partners can only impose zero tariffs against
15For illustration purposes I only consider the case of bilateral FTA. Moreover, all numerical results in this section
are computed using the benchmark model in which political weights are not incorporated.
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them even in a trade war.
Another pattern shown in Table 12 is that all countries’ welfare loss as FTA members is less
than the loss outside FTA. In other words, the magnitude of the welfare change for a non-FTA
country due to the punishment effect from two FTA countries is on average less than the magnitude
of the welfare change for the same country due to zero tariffs from its FTA partner. This result
implies a country’s welfare is convex in other countries’ tariffs, which is consistent with existing
theory.
Finally, I use equation (3) to calculate the minimum patience needed to sustain the equilibrium
in which two countries negotiate a FTA. The results are presented in Table 13. In all cases, the
calculated β j is less than one. Comparing the last two columns, we can see the average β j for
all countries under “non-FTA” are larger than those under “Factual.” This result is consistent
with the results shown in Table 11 and Table 12: when two other countries negotiate a FTA, a
non-member country’s gain from deviation does not change, but its loss in trade war decreases
due to the punishment effect. Therefore, new FTAs actually make outside countries more likely to
deviate from negotiated current tariffs. On the other hand, no such pattern is found for entries under
“FTA.” Compared to “Factual,” India and Canada’s average β j increases while that for the other
eight countries decreases, because both the FTA member countries’ welfare gain from deviation
and welfare loss in trade war decrease. Depending on the relative magnitude of changes in gain
and loss, the propensity to deviate can change either way.
VI Sustainability of Future Trade Liberalization
This section utilizes the procedure developed in Section II to analyze how equilibrium strategies
and hence sustainability of negotiated tariffs vary with exogenous multilateral trade liberalization.
Contrary to Section V in which trade liberalization is bilateral, I now focus on the counterfactual
scenario that trade liberalization takes place globally and symmetrically. In other words, assuming
every country reduces tariffs to ρ percent of the original level, we can then treat (ρtCj , ρt
C
− j) in
the cooperative static equilibrium as factual tariffs, and quantify equilibrium strategies in these
“counterfactual cooperative equilibria.” In this setup, ρ can be considered a measure of trade
liberalization from 1 (factual level of tariffs) to 0 (free trade). Therefore, in the remainder of
this section, ρ will also be used to refer to the counterfactual cooperative equilibria that represent
different stages of global trade liberalization . The main results are exhibited in Figure 3, which
plots β j for all countries with given ρ using trade war as the scenario in the punishment phase. The
plot shows the counterfactual cooperative equilibrium is sustainable regardless of the value of ρ.
In addition, with the exception of Japan, all other countries’ propensity to deviate does not vary
much with the extent of trade liberalization.
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The setup explored in this section is related to Bagwell and Staiger (1990), in which the au-
thors analyze the impact of trade volume on trade-policy cooperation. By analyzing a repeated
game that incorporates a two-country partial equilibrium model as a stage game, they show the
level of protection must rise in a cooperative equilibrium in periods of high trade volume to hold
the incentive to deviate in check. Testing this theoretical result directly is possible by assuming
exogenous changes in trade volume and calculating how the lowest sustainable cooperative tariffs
vary accordingly. However, calculating the cooperative tariffs of 10 countries and 33 sectors is ex-
tremely computationally demanding and requires further assumption on the bargaining procedure
(see Ossa, 2014). In addition, predicting changes in trade volume in future trade liberalization is
difficult to model and involves further arbitrary assumptions. My approach that assumes symmet-
ric reduction in tariffs requires far less computational power and resonates with the principle of
reciprocity, which is embodied in the WTO practice.
To plot Figure 3, I first compute 20 different equilibria with symmetric tariff reduction ranging
from 5% to 100% (free trade). For each ρ, I then compute each country’s welfare change in both
the deviation phase and global trade war in the punishment phase,treating (ρtCj , ρt
C
− j) as the static
cooperative equilibrium.16 Notice that in Bagwell and Staiger (1990), gain from deviation depends
on trade volume but expected loss in the punishment phase is fixed. Under my approach, however,
both gain and loss will change with ρ.
When analyzing welfare changes in equilibria with various degrees of trade liberalization, wel-
fare changes relative to the factual static cooperative equilibrium (tCj , t
C
− j) are different from those
relative to the counterfactual cooperative equilibria (ρtCj , ρt
C
− j). Let Ω
F
j (ρ) denote country j’s maxi-
mum welfare gain when deviating from counterfactual equilibrium ρ, measured relative to its wel-
fare in the factual equilibrium, and let Ψ j(ρ) denote the country j’s welfare change from the factual
equilibrium to the counterfactual equilibrium ρ. Then the deviation gain in equilibrium ρ relative
to welfare in the counterfactual cooperative equilibrium, denoted by ΩCFj (ρ), can be calculated by
the following equation:
ΩCFj (ρ) + 1 =
ΩFj (ρ) + 1
Ψ j(ρ) + 1
. (17)
ΩCFj (ρ) instead of Ω
F
j (ρ) is the gain from deviation that should be used in calculating the min-
imum length of the punishment phase in counterfactual equilibrium ρ. In theory, as ρ increases,
aggregate welfare should also improve in the counterfactual equilibrium due to increasing trade
volume. Previous research on trade-policy theory also predicts that, relative to the factual equilib-
16Trade war is also the punishment strategy considered in Bagwell and Staiger (1990). In addition, sanction is not
considered because of the computational constraint: for every value of ρ, 10 possible sanction scenarios need to be
computed as compared to just one trade war scenario.
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rium, average welfare gain from deviation is larger when the tariff level in the cooperative stage
game is lower. Because both the numerator and the denominator of the right-hand side of (17) are
increasing in ρ, no prediction on how ΩCFj (t
D
j , ρ) changes in ρ can be formed from theory. Figure 4
plots the two calculated average welfare gains from deviation. As expected, the average gain from
deviation relative to factual equilibrium increases monotonically with trade liberalization. A simi-
lar pattern is also found for that relative to counterfactual equilibrium. Combining this result with
(17), we can see the magnitude of the average increase in ΩFj is larger relative to that in Ψ j(ρ).
The relationship between welfare changes in the punishment phase and trade liberalization can
be analyzed analogously. Using the same notations, we have the following:
ΦCFj (ρ) + 1 =
ΦFj (ρ) + 1
Ψ j(ρ) + 1
(18)
where ΦCFj (ρ) and Φ
F
j (ρ) are static welfare loss in the punishment phase relative to the ρ counterfac-
tual equilibrium and the factual equilibrium, respectively. Because the scenario in the punishment
phase I choose to focus on in this section is trade war, ΦFj (ρ) should not vary in ρ: the resulting
Nash equilibrium in the stage game does not depend on tariff levels in counterfactual cooperative
equilibrium. This prediction from theory is exactly what is presented in Figure 5, which plots
static average welfare changes in the punishment phase. Because average welfare improves as
all countries liberalize trade symmetrically, ΦCFj (ρ) also increases in magnitude along with trade
liberalization.17 In addition, the magnitude of changes in welfare loss is also comparable to that
in welfare gain, as shown in Figure 4. Furthermore, calculations show ΦCFj (ρ) is negative in all
counterfactual equilibria. Therefore, cooperation can always be sustained and exogenous shocks
need to be introduced to analyze how countries’ incentive to deviate varies with ρ.
Figure 6 illustrates how Ψ j(ρ) of each country varies with ρ. We can see that as ρ decreases
from one to zero, welfare change varies significantly across countries. Japan appears to have the
largest welfare gain of trade liberalization in static cooperative equilibrium, because moving from
factual tariffs to free trade increases its welfare by almost 2%. Again, this result can be explained
by Japan’s high factual tariffs in certain industries. On the other hand, as the largest loser, Russia
bears a welfare loss of about 0.7% in free trade. Also, note that welfare change is not always
monotone in ρ. For example, India’s welfare change increases until ρ moves to about 0.3% and
then decreases when trade further liberalizes.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 jointly explain the pattern observed for all countries except Japan in
Figure 3. As trade liberalizes in a multilateral manner, countries’ average gain from deviation and
17From Figure 5, average welfare reaches its maximum when ρ is slightly greater than zero. This result is probably
due to the average welfare not being weighted by country size. As Figure 6 shows, Russia’s welfare decreases with
trade liberalization, but its aggregate expenditure is small relative to other countries.
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average loss in the punishment phase both increase. Hence, countries’ propensity to deviate should
not vary much with trade liberalization. The exceptional case of Japan is again due to its highly
distortive factual tariffs. When ρ decreases, Japan’s welfare gain by imposing optimal tariffs also
decreases significantly. As shown in Table 3 and Table 4, Japan’s welfare loss in trade war is the
smallest among all countries. Therefore, even though its Ψ j(ρ) is also larger than other countries,
the resulting ΦCFj (ρ) is still small relative to its Ω
CF
j (ρ). As a result, Japan’s propensity to deviate
reduces drastically along with worldwide trade liberalization.
VII Conclusion
In this paper, I propose a methodology to quantify countries’ equilibrium strategies on tariffs in
a repeated-game framework that has been widely used in the trade-policy literature. I characterize
a country’s equilibrium strategy by its gain from deviation, loss as a consequence of deviation,
and the minimum patience such that the negotiated low tariffs are sustainable. To illustrate this
methodology, I construct a reasonably comprehensive general equilibrium trade model and numer-
ically compute the equilibrium strategies of major participants of international trade. Next, I use
this model to study some existing theoretical findings that are yet to be quantitatively analyzed.
First, I find that in a counterfactual scenario without a multilateral enforcement mechanism, fac-
tual tariffs are not sustainable. However, the welfare consequences are quantitatively insignificant.
Then I move to analyze the impact of FTAs, and quantitatively investigate the tariff complemen-
tarity effect and the punishment effect. Comparing the propensity to deviate before and after FTAs
are negotiated, I find that FTAs reduce the sustainability of multilateral cooperation in trade policy
in general. Lastly, I show that, with the exception of Japan, other major countries’ propensity to
deviate does not vary much along with exogenous trade liberalization.
This paper is the first quantitative exercise of trade policy in a repeated game framework. By
computing the welfare effects of trade policy in a reasonably comprehensive quantitative trade
model, I can numerically examine the existing theoretical findings derived from simpler trade
models. In addition to quantify the welfare effects of Nash tariffs and autarky which are commonly
used in the theoretical analysis, I also incorporate two alternative means of punishments that are
less stringent and hence more realistic. If the trade model used to quantify equilibrium strategies
and calculate the propensity to deviate is taken to be realistic, the results presented can be treated
as answers to questions of immediate policy relevance.
The methodology discussed in this paper can be applied to quantitatively analyze trade policy
in many ways. For example, one can build a Melitz (2003) style model that features heterogeneous
firms. Another interesting extension is to allow deviation and punishment to be industry specific,
and to study the sustainability of cooperation at the industry level. Lastly, I abstract from collusion
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among countries throughout this paper. It may be interesting to investigate the scenario in which
two or more countries deviate at the same time and maximize their welfare jointly.
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Appendix
A Data
Similar to Ossa (2014), the trade, production, and applied tariff data come from the Global
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 8 database. This database is based on a number of underlying
databases. The database is documented in Narayanan, Aguiar and McDougall, eds (2012), which
can be accessed directly from the GTAP website under http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu. Bound
tariff data comes from the International Trade Centre’s Market Access Map database, which is also
the original data source of GTAP’s allied tariff data.
Demand elasticity estimation follows Ossa (2016), which uses the Feenstra (1994) method
with the UN Comtrade data for the period 1994-2008. In addition, political weights for the United
States, China, Japan, India and the European Union are taken directly from Ossa (2014). For the
remaining five countries, I compute their political weights using the algorithm discussed in Ossa
(2014). The main idea is to iterate the political weights until the optimal unilateral tariffs converge
to the distribution of factual tariffs. Readers interested in more details can go to Section A, B, and
D of the Appendix in Ossa (2014).
B Punishment Lasting Finite Number of Periods
Consider the following strategy of the repeated game:
1. Each country imposes cooperative tariffs tC in every stage game unless some country devi-
ated from cooperation in the past.
2. If some country has not played tC in the past and some other countries incur a welfare loss
in the deviation phase, every country will enter a punishment phase and impose tP for K
periods and then return to imposing cooperative tariffs.
Given discount factor β, one-period welfare gain from deviation Ω j(tDj ), and one-period welfare
loss in the punishment phase Φ j(tPj , t
P
− j), solving the following equation will give the minimum
length of the punishment phase necessarily for country j to sustain cooperation:
Ω j(tDj ) +
β(1 − βK)
1 − β Φ j(t
P
j , t
P
− j) = 0 (B.1)
We can denote the solution to this equation as K j. Whereas the model features discrete time, I
allow the resulting K j to be a non-integer. Given that both Ω j and Φ j are positive and β is not too
small, the calculated K j will be a positive number. When the length of the punishment phase in the
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aforementioned strategy is larger than K j, it is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game, in which
the cooperative stage equilibrium is sustained.
Both infinite punishment and punishment with finite periods have been considered as equilib-
rium strategies in works that model trade policy cooperation in a repeated game, although infinite
reversion (to Nash tariffs) is used more often. Both the minimum patience β j and the minimum
length of the punishment phase K j can be used as measures of the sustainability of the cooperative
equilibrium. For example, the cooperative equilibrium is unsustainable when β j ≥ 1 or K j < 0.
Even when the cooperative equilibrium is sustainable, countries are more likely to deviate when β j
increases or K j decreases. In fact, the following lemma shows that comparing β j between countries
is equivalent to comparing K j when analyzing the sustainability of the cooperative stage equilib-
rium.
Lemma 1 Let β and K be the solution to (3) and (B.1) respectively. If country j and country l
have the same discount factor β, then β j > βl ↔ K j > Kl.
Proof. From (3), β j > βl implies
Ω j
Ω j−Φ j >
Ωl
Ωl−Φl . Since Ω j > Φ j and Ωl > Φl, we have
−Φ j
Ω j
< −Φl
Ωl
.
From (B.1), we have β(1−β
K j )
1−β =
−Ω j
Φ j
and β(1−β
Kl )
1−β =
−Ωl
Φl
. Since β ∈ (0, 1), it must be the case that
K j > Kl. By the same procedure, we can also show that K j > Kl implies β j > βl.
Because of the equivalence of β j and K j, either measure can be used as a measure of countries’
propensity to deviate. When Nash tariffs or autarky is used in the punishment phase, the strategy
involving infinite punishment phase is subgame perfect but the one involving finite punishment
phase is not. In other words, in the case with finite periods of punishment, the punishing countries
will not have any incentive to return to cooperative tariffs once the punishment phase commences.
This difference does not affect the quantitative analysis in this paper.
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Figure 1: Trade-Weighted Tariffs in Japan
32
Figure 2: Percentage Welfare Changes in Bilateral Trade War
Notes: This scatter plot shows the percentage welfare changes in bi-
lateral trade war. For each country pair, the country with the greater
welfare change is always set to be the x-coordinate.
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Figure 3: β j with Counterfactual Negotiated Tariffs
Notes: This figure illustrates how the minimum patience of each country varies with world wide trade liberalization. Trade war
is taken to be the static equilibrium in the punishment phase when calculating β j. ρ denotes the ratio of counterfactual negotiated
tariffs to the factual tariffs, ranging from 0 (free trade) to 1 (factual tariffs).
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Figure 4: Average Welfare Gain from Deviation with Trade Liberalization
Figure 5: Average Welfare Loss in Punishment Phase with Trade Liberalization
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Figure 6: Ψ j(ρ) with Trade Liberalization
Notes: This figure illustrates how Ψ j(ρ) for each country varies with ρ.
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Table 1: Summary by Sectors
σ Applied Tariff Political Weight
Raw and processed rice 4.873 0.319 1.336
Wheat 12.373 0.106 1.443
Cereal grains nec 3.291 0.118 1.116
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 2.188 0.158 0.886
Oil seeds 2.889 0.18 1.32
Raw and processed sugar 2.521 0.228 1.054
Plant-based fibers 2.333 0.019 0.676
Crops nec 2.536 0.093 0.846
Cattle,sheep,goats,horses 2.582 0.031 0.864
Animal products nec 2.124 0.044 0.694
Raw and processed dairy 5.604 0.296 1.358
Wool, silk-worm cocoons 2.893 0.041 0.835
Forestry 2.332 0.028 0.741
Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse 4.391 0.114 1.147
Meat products nec 3.135 0.145 1.081
Vegetable oils and fats 4.981 0.112 1.153
Food products nec 2.777 0.141 0.993
Beverages and tobacco products 2.935 0.263 1.186
Textiles 2.903 0.1 1.014
Wearing apparel 5.311 0.123 1.247
Leather products 4.106 0.094 1.121
Wood products 2.288 0.066 0.82
Paper products, publishing 2.733 0.04 0.857
Chemical,rubber,plastic prods 2.375 0.05 0.816
Mineral products nec 2.47 0.065 0.871
Ferrous metals 3.014 0.044 0.957
Metals nec 4.384 0.042 1.041
Metal products 2.794 0.067 0.933
Motor vehicles and parts 3.126 0.086 0.986
Transport equipment nec 2.992 0.047 0.891
Electronic equipment 2.492 0.023 0.818
Machinery and equipment nec 2.374 0.047 0.831
Manufactures nec 3.515 0.065 1.068
Average 3.444 0.103 1
Notes: Entries under “σ” are estimates of elasticity of substitution. Entries
under “Applied Tariff” are averages of applied tariffs. Entries under “Political
Weight” are averages of estimated political weights which are scaled to have
mean one.
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Table 2: Welfare Changes in the Deviation Phase
No Political Weights With Political Weights
Own Other Own Other
China 1.62 -0.89 1.2 -0.69
Japan 3.37 -0.37 2.55 -0.48
Korea 2.5 -0.17 2.9 -0.2
India 1.99 -0.06 0.59 -0.04
Canada 4.5 -0.11 3.44 -0.1
United States 2.38 -1.55 2.55 -1.53
Mercosur 1.1 -0.09 0.81 -0.06
European Union 1.89 -1.25 2.21 -1.38
Russia 1.88 -0.07 1.46 -0.05
Rest of World 2.68 -1.22 2.84 -1.21
Mean 2.39 -0.58 2.05 -0.57
Notes: The entries under “Own” are the percentage welfare change
of the deviating country. Entries under “other” are the average of
percentage welfare changes of other non-deviating countries.
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Table 3: Welfare Changes in the Punishment Phase
WTO Bound Sanction Trade War Autarky
China 1.03 -0.29 -2.06 -11.6
Japan 3.03 0.59 -1.5 -12.97
Korea 2.09 -1.63 -4.62 -21.09
India 1.05 -0.21 -1.91 -10.98
Canada 3.27 -3.03 -7.82 -31.79
United States 1.5 -0.38 -2.38 -13.35
Mercosur 0.15 -0.23 -1.89 -9.93
European Union 1.09 -0.87 -2.5 -12.09
Russia 0.89 -1.56 -4.67 -20.31
Rest of World 1.59 -2.15 -5.55 -23.09
Mean 1.57 -0.98 -3.49 -16.72
Notes: Each entry represents the deviating country’s percentage wel-
fare change relative to the factual equilibrium in each period of the
punishment phase.
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Table 4: Welfare Changes in the Punishment Phase (With Political Weights)
WTO Bound Sanction Trade War Autarky
China 0.55 -1.07 -3.19 -13
Japan 2.24 0.65 -1.31 -11.23
Korea 2.56 -0.37 -3.83 -20.09
India -0.41 -1.64 -3.61 -11.97
Canada 2.26 -4.05 -8.96 -32.61
United States 1.72 -0.1 -2.18 -12.93
Mercosur -0.22 -1.07 -2.87 -10.7
European Union 1.42 -0.3 -2.1 -11.8
Russia 0.42 -2.33 -5.87 -21.13
Rest of World 1.72 -2.04 -5.8 -23.25
Mean 1.23 -1.23 -3.97 -16.87
Notes: Each entry represents the deviating country’s percentage wel-
fare change relative to the factual equilibrium in each period of the
punishment phase.
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Table 5: Median Tariffs in Sanction and Trade War
Median Tariffs Factual Sanction Trade War
Own Other Own Other Own Other
China 4.5 5.6 60.2 27.2 57.7 55.9
Japan 1.0 5.4 56.5 29.0 56.5 55.2
Korea 5.3 5.1 55.6 29.0 56.0 54.6
India 15.0 3.2 53.9 26.0 53.6 57.0
Canada 0.7 5.0 57.6 27.4 54.9 57.3
United States 0.9 5.1 62.2 28.6 59.4 55.9
Mercosur 8.2 4.3 56.0 25.9 54.7 56.7
European Union 2.1 6.1 57.5 27.6 57.9 56.5
Russia 8.8 2.2 59.8 27.0 54.5 55.6
Rest of World 6.3 3.2 61.1 28.8 59.6 57.1
Mean 5.3 4.5 58.0 27.7 56.5 56.2
Notes: The entries under “Own” are median tariffs imposed against
other countries, whereas those under “Other” are median tariffs im-
posed by other countries. Note that under “Sanction,” each row rep-
resents one static equilibrium with one specific deviating country,
whereas under “Trade War,” all entries are calculated from one static
equilibrium.
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Table 6: Minimum Patience
WTO Bound Sanction Trade War Autarky
China 2.76 0.85 0.44 0.12
Japan 9.78 1.21 0.69 0.21
Korea 6.04 0.6 0.35 0.11
India 2.12 0.91 0.51 0.15
Canada 3.65 0.6 0.37 0.12
United States 2.7 0.86 0.5 0.15
Mercosur 1.16 0.83 0.37 0.1
European Union 2.36 0.69 0.43 0.14
Russia 1.89 0.55 0.29 0.08
Rest of World 2.44 0.56 0.33 0.1
Mean 3.49 0.76 0.43 0.13
Notes: The entries are β j calculated from equation (3) under four different
scenarios in the punishment phase.
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Table 7: Minimum Patience (With Political Weights)
WTO Bound Sanction Trade War Autarky
China 1.84 0.53 0.27 0.08
Japan 8.05 1.34 0.66 0.19
Korea 8.43 0.89 0.43 0.13
India 0.59 0.26 0.14 0.05
Canada 2.92 0.46 0.28 0.1
United States 3.07 0.96 0.54 0.16
Mercosur 0.79 0.43 0.22 0.07
European Union 2.8 0.88 0.51 0.16
Russia 1.4 0.39 0.2 0.06
Rest of World 2.55 0.58 0.33 0.11
Mean 3.24 0.67 0.36 0.11
Notes: The entries are β j calculated from equation (3) under four different
scenarios in the punishment phase.
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Table 8: Percentage Welfare Changes with Unilateral Country-Specific Tariffs
Self Target Others
Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min
China 0.09 0.34 0.01 -0.5 -0.14 -1.46 0.01 0.29 -0.03
Japan 0.44 1.35 0.01 -0.17 -0.04 -0.36 0 0.03 -0.01
Korea 0.13 0.29 0.01 -0.08 0.01 -0.23 0 0.03 -0.01
India 0.30 0.75 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.12 0 0.01 -0.01
Canada 0.32 1.60 0 -0.06 -0.01 -0.38 0 0.03 0
United States 0.13 0.37 0 -0.91 -0.14 -5.29 0.02 0.3 -0.05
Mercosur 0.06 0.16 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 0 0.01 0
European Union 0.11 0.47 0.02 -0.64 -0.30 -1.66 0.02 0.17 -0.1
Russia 0.11 0.53 0 -0.03 0 -0.10 0 0.01 -0.03
Rest of World 0.14 0.67 0.02 -0.71 -0.31 -1.49 0.04 0.58 -0.01
Mean 0.18 0.65 0.01 -0.32 -0.1 -1.12 0.01 0.15 -0.02
Notes: The entries under “Self” are summary statistics of welfare changes of countries
imposing optimal tariffs against one target country only. The entries under “Target”
are summary statistics of welfare changes of the target countries. The entries under
“Others” are summary statistics of welfare changes of the countries that are neither the
deviating country nor the target country. Note that for each country, the “Self” and
“Target” columns each contain a sample of size 9, whereas the “Other” column contains
a sample of size 72.
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Table 9: Winners and Losers of Bilateral Trade War
(Winner, Loser) Average Tariffs Import Share Export Share
Winner Loser Winner Loser Winner Loser
(China, Korea) 0.06 0.18 0.12 0.21 0.07 0.36
(China, RoW) 0.06 0.08 0.39 0.13 0.24 0.22
(Japan, China) 0.26 0.05 0.25 0.16 0.27 0.15
(Japan, USA) 0.22 0.04 0.18 0.08 0.15 0.09
(Japan, RoW) 0.23 0.08 0.32 0.09 0.27 0.1
(India, Canada) 0.26 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(India, Mercosur) 0.26 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
(India, Russia) 0.17 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
(Canada, EU) 0.1 0.06 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.02
(Mercosur, Korea) 0.09 0.1 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01
(Mercosur, Russia) 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Mean 0.16 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.09
Notes: Entries under “Average Tariffs” are the winner or loser country’s
average tariff level against each other. Entries under “Import share” are
the total imports of the winner or loser from the other country as the share
of total imports. Entries under “Export share” are calculated similarly.
45
Table 10: Multilateral versus Bilateral Enforcement Mechanism
Welfare Sustainability
∆W deviating deviated β jBI>β j M β jBI<β j M
China 0.03 2 1 2 5
Japan 0.80 3 0 3 3
Korea -0.94 1 3 4 4
India 0.80 4 1 3 2
Canada 0.46 1 1 2 6
United States -0.01 0 1 3 6
Mercosur 0.04 2 1 3 4
European Union 0.10 0 1 4 5
Russia -0.08 0 2 3 6
Rest of World -1.08 0 2 5 4
Notes: The three columns under “Welfare” are the resulting percentage wel-
fare changes in the new equilibrium when both sides of the unsustainable
country pair impose bilateral Nash tariffs, and the number of cases in which
the country deviates or is deviated against. The remaining two columns de-
scribe changes in the propensity to deviate for the remaining country pairs.
Entries under “β jBI > β jM” and “β jBI < β jM”are the respective number of
cases in which the calculated minimum patience is greater/less than that if the
corresponding multilateral enforcement were used in the punishment phase.
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Table 11: Complementarity Effect
∆W Median Tariffs
FTA non-FTA Factual FTA non-FTA Factual
China 1.22 1.62 1.62 44.9 58.1 58.0
Japan 2.96 3.37 3.37 43.2 57.6 57.3
Korea 1.86 2.50 2.50 41.0 56.1 56.1
India 1.64 1.98 1.99 44.1 54.1 53.5
Canada 3.69 4.49 4.50 44.0 55.5 55.5
United States 1.86 2.38 2.38 45.6 60.3 60.3
Mercosur 0.82 1.10 1.10 43.7 54.7 54.6
European Union 1.49 1.89 1.89 45.3 59.5 59.5
Russia 1.36 1.87 1.88 42.9 53.0 52.8
Rest of World 1.96 2.68 2.68 45.9 60.4 60.4
Mean 1.89 2.39 2.39 44.1 56.9 56.8
Notes: Entries under “∆W” are the average percentage changes in welfare in
the deviation phase, measured relative to the factual equilibrium. Entries under
“Median Tariffs” are the average of median optimal tariffs imposed in the de-
viation phase. Columns labeled “FTA”, “non-FTA” and “Factual” refer to the
stage equilibrium at the beginning of the repeated game: counterfactual equi-
libria in which the country is a FTA member, those in which the country is not
a member, and the factual equilibrium respectively. Entries under “FTA” are
average values over nine equilibria while those under “non-FTA” are averages
over 36 equilibria. The last row reports averages over countries.
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Table 12: Punishment Effect
∆W Median Tariffs
FTA non-FTA Factual FTA non-FTA Factual
China -1.82 -1.93 -2.06 45.6 57.5 57.7
Japan -1.00 -1.35 -1.50 43.5 56.0 56.5
Korea -3.84 -4.40 -4.62 41.4 55.6 56.0
India -1.44 -1.80 -1.91 45.0 53.7 53.6
Canada -6.58 -7.42 -7.82 45.0 54.9 54.9
United States -2.11 -2.24 -2.38 46.3 59.1 59.4
Mercosur -1.58 -1.77 -1.89 44.4 54.9 54.7
European Union -2.20 -2.38 -2.50 45.6 57.6 57.9
Russia -4.03 -4.39 -4.67 45.4 55.2 54.5
Rest of World -5.07 -5.32 -5.55 47.0 59.4 59.6
Mean -2.97 -3.30 -3.49 44.9 56.4 56.5
Notes: Entries under “∆W” are the one-period average percentage changes
in welfare in the punishment phase, measured relative to the factual equilib-
rium. Entries under “Median Tariffs” are the average of the median optimal
tariffs imposed in the punishment phase. Columns labeled “FTA,” “non-FTA,”
and “Factual” refer to the stage equilibrium at the beginning of the repeated
game: counterfactual equilibria in which the country is an FTA member, those
in which the country is not a member, and the factual equilibrium, respectively.
Entries under “FTA” are average values over nine equilibria, whereas those un-
der “non-FTA” are averages over 36 equilibria. The last row reports averages
over countries.
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Table 13: Minimum Patience with FTA
FTA non-FTA Factual
China 0.39 0.46 0.44
Japan 0.64 0.72 0.69
Korea 0.32 0.36 0.35
India 0.51 0.53 0.51
Canada 0.38 0.38 0.37
United States 0.46 0.52 0.5
Mercosur 0.34 0.39 0.37
European Union 0.39 0.44 0.43
Russia 0.26 0.3 0.29
Rest of World 0.27 0.34 0.33
Mean 0.40 0.44 0.43
Notes: Columns labeled “FTA,” “non-FTA,” and “Factual” refer to
the stage equilibrium at the beginning of the repeated game: coun-
terfactual equilibria in which the country is an FTA member, those
in which the country is not a member, and the factual equilibrium,
respectively. Entries under “FTA” are the country’s average β j over
nine equilibria, whereas those under “non-FTA” are averages over 36
equilibria. The last row reports averages over countries.
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